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PROPERTY - POWERS - STATE POWERS STATUTES PROTECTING 
CREDITORS AND REQUIRING FORMAL EXECUTION-In 1829, the New 
York Legislature enacted a lengthy statute on powers of appoint-
ment, which abolished the common law and undertook a complete 
realignment of the law of powers.1 It covered such important 
subjects as the types of powers, the interest taken by a donee of a 
power, creditors' rights against appointive property, powers in 
trust, and requirements for the execution of powers. Since then, 
seven other jurisdictions, including Michigan, have followed suit, 
borro,;\Ting the New York statute.2 One, Minnesota, in 1943 
repealed its powers statute and reinstated the common law except 
lN.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) 732, §73 et seq., now 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws. (McKinney, 1945) 
§§130-183. 
2Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §§75-93; D.C. Code (1951) tit. 45, c. 10, §§45-1001 to 45-1019; 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.1 to 556-106; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§59-0501 to 
59-0559; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 60, §§181-229; S.D. Code (1939) §§59.0401 to 59.0461; Wis. 
Stat. (1957) §§232.01 to 232.58. Hereafter all statutory citations in the text will be to Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948), unless otherwise indicated. 
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as modified.3 Two other states have piecemeal legislation on 
execution requirements,4 and one other state has legislation on 
creditors' rights.5 
In most of these states the powers statutes have received very 
little interpretation. While decisions in a few of these states are 
of some assistance, the diversity of interpretations they adopt leaves 
most questions unanswered. This comment isolates some, but by 
no means all, of the interpretative problems and tries to supply 
the necessary answers. 
The first part of the comment considers the elevation sections 
of the statute-sections that change the donee's interest in the 
appointive or dispositive property to a fee for the benefit of 
creditors. The second part considers the execution sections of 
the statute-sections that subject the execution of powers to con-
veyancing requirements. These sections are of the utmost signifi-
cance to estate planners. 
l. ELEVATION OF THE DONEE'S INTEREST TO A FEE 
"When an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied 
by any trust, shall be given to the owner of a particular estate, 
for life or years, such estate shall be changed into a fee, abso-
lute in respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but 
subject to any future estates limited thereon, in case the power 
should not be executed, or the lands should not be sold for 
the satisfaction of debts."6 
A. Statutory History and Purpose: Creditors' Rights at Common 
Law and the Common Law Rules on Elevation 
The elevation sections are addressed to the resolution of two 
distinct common-law problems. One had to do with the rights 
of a donee's creditors to reach property covered by his power of 
appointment. Before the exercise of the power creditors could 
not satisfy out of the appointive property debts owed them by the 
donee. Only after exercise could creditors reach appointive 
property then in the hands of an appointee. And even this right 
was surrounded by certain conditions. The appointee had to be 
a volunteer; a bona fide purchaser was safe from attack. The 
3 Minn. Stat. (1957) §§502.62 to 502.78. 
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) §394.070; Va. Code (1950) §64-52. 
5 Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §64-106. 
6 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.9. There are really three elevation sections. See 
also Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.10, 556.11. 
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power had to be a general one; if limited, or special, creditors 
were unsuccessful. Finally, the donee had to be insolvent.7 So 
at common law, creditors had strictly limited rights against ap-
pointive property and often had to stand by helpless while their 
debtor-donee, given a small interest in the appointive property-
a life estate, for example-enjoyed it and then passed it on to others 
who might also be safe from the donee's creditors.8 Yet the donee's 
general power of appointment was virtually equivalent to owner-
ship of the appointive property, and it was manifestly unfair to 
deny creditors free access thereto.9 
The other common-law problem with which the elevation 
sections deal was an interpretative one. A donor might give his 
donee a life estate with an absolute power of disposition over the 
fee,10 remainder limited over to another. Courts were faced with 
a question of construction: did the donor intend the donee to 
have a fee or only a life estate? The majority rule at common 
law was that a donee's absolute power of disposition did not con-
vert his life tenancy into a fee. But a minority of courts held that 
the donee's absolute power of disposition enlarged, or elevated, 
his life interest to a fee.11 The effect of the minority rule was to 
destroy any remainders that were limited after the donee's "ten-
ancy." This rule thus protected the donee's creditors, since they 
had a fee interest to levy upon, but hurt remaindermen by elimi-
nating their interests.12 
The statutory revision inaugurated by New York13 amalgamat-
ed these two distinct common law problems and provided a solution 
to both. Now, according to the elevation sections, the interest of 
7 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§944-946 (1956); GLENN, FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., §158 (1940); comment, 41 MICH. L. R.Ev. 289 at 289 
(1942); note, 27 VA. L. R.Ev. 1052 at 1052-1053 (1941). 
s See Matter of Davies, 242 N.Y. 196 at 200-201, 151 N.E. 205 (1926). 
9 See Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 at 537-538 (1881). 
10 The courts characterized as a power of "disposition" the following kinds of powers 
(either singly or in some combination): sell, enjoy, consume, dispose, or use. See the cases 
cited in the annotations referred to in note 11 infra. 
1136 A.L.R. 1177 (1925), 76 A.L.R. 1153 (1932); note, 30 MICH. L. R.Ev. 796 at 797 
(1932); Summers, "Power of a Life Tenant to Dispose of a Fee," 6 !ND. L. J. 137 at 138-139 
(1930); SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §893 (1956). All authorities agreed that 
when the donee of a power was given an indefinite or general estate - e.g., "to X, with 
a power to dispose of the fee" - the donee's estate was enlarged to a fee. Reeves v. 
Tatum, 233 Ala. 455 at 457, 172 S. 247 (1937); note, 29 MICH. L. R.Ev. 761 at 761 (1931); 
Summers, supra, at 138-139; FoWLER, REAL PROPERTY LAw OF NEW YoRK 353 (1899). 
12 See Alford's Admr. v. Alford's Admr., 56 Ala. 350 at 352-353 (1876). 
13 For references to New York legislative history, see Whiteside and Edelstein, "Life 
Estates with Power to Consume: Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and Remaindermen: A 
Study of New York Real Property Law Sections 149-153," 16 CORN. L.Q. 447 at 453-456 
(1931). 
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a donee of an absolute power of disposition,14 not accompanied by 
any trust, when given an estate for life or years, or no particular 
estate at all, was elevated to a fee, absolute as to creditors and 
purchasers, but subject to any limitations over if the power went 
unexercised or the lands were not sold for satisfaction of debts.15 
Protection was thus provided for both creditors and remaindermen. 
B. Impact on Creditors' Rights 
These elevation sections have entirely abolished the common 
law of creditors' rights in appointive property.16 Creditors now take 
their rights exclusively from the statute; if they have none there, 
they have none at all.17 Now creation of the power, rather than 
its exercise, is the source of creditors' rights. If creditors can 
reach appointive property before exercise of the power, they can 
reach it after exercise of the power. Conversely, if they cannot 
reach appointive property before exercise, exercise will not help 
them, as it did at common law.18 So long as the donee gets an 
absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by any trust, the 
creditors can take that property in satisfaction of the donee's debts, 
irrespective of the donee's solvency. Nor does the death of the 
donee affect the right of creditors to reach appointive property in 
the µands of remaindermen or appointees; creditors may enforce 
their rights by sale of the property even after the donee's death.19 
14 It is plain that the statutes are designed to cover both powers of appointment and 
powers of disposition. The Michigan statutes, for example, provide: 
"Powers, except as authorized and provided for in this chapter, are abolished; and 
from the time this chapter shall be in force, the creation, construction and execution 
of powers shall be governed by the provisio1,1s herein contained." 
"A power is an authority to do some act in relation to lands, or the creation of 
estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the owner granting or reserving such 
power, might himself lawfully perform." 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.I to 556.2. The writer has found no cases decided under 
the statutes which draw any distinction between powers of appointment and powers of 
disposition. 
15 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9 to 556.10. The same elevation took place if there 
was no limitation after the donee's estate. Id. at §556.11. 
16 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., §159 (1940); Whiteside 
and Edelstein, "Life Estates with Power to Consume: Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and 
Remaindermen: A Study of New York Real Property Law Sections 149-153," 16 CoRN. 
L. Q. 447 at 461 (1931). 
17 Comment, 21 ALBANY L. R.Ev. 216 at 216-222 (1957). 
18 Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 at 529, 535-537 (1881); comment, 21 
ALBANY L. R.Ev. 216 at 216-222 (1957). See also Whiteside and Edelstein, "Life Estates 
with Power to Consume: Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and Remaindermen: A Study of 
New York Real Property Law Sections 149-153," 16 CoRN. L. Q. 447 at 464 (1931). 
19 Matter of Davies, 242 N.Y. 196 at 201-202, 151 N.E. 205 (1926). See Whiteside and 
Edelstein, "Life Estates with Power to Consume: Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and 
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There is thus no requirement that creditors get execution on the 
property during the donee's life or before execution of the power. 
It should be noted that the elevation section is in aid of pur-
chasers as well as creditors. And in New York, incumbrancers 
are included.20 Examples of cases in which these people suc-
cessfully used the statute are set out in the accompanying note.21 
C. The Extent of Elevation: Statutory Fee Compared With 
Common Law Fee 
I. The Reversion 
It is clear that the statutory fee given the donee by the elevation 
sections is absolute as to the enumerated classes protected: creditors 
and purchasers. It is clear also that express remainders limited 
after the donee's estate are protected if creditors do not attach 
and the donee does not execute his power. But if (I) there are 
no creditors' or purchasers' rights involved, (2) the power is not 
executed, and (3) there is no limitation over, does the donee still 
get an absolute fee-that is, one which he can devise or one which, 
if he does not devise, will descend by the laws of intestate suc-
cession-or are the elevation sections inapplicable in this case, the 
donee's interest remaining a life estate, and the fee interest re-
verting to the estate of the donor? It might be thought that one 
of the elevation sections [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.11] 
provides an obvious answer: "In all cases where such power of 
disposition is given, and no remainder is limited on the estate of 
the grantee of the power, such grantee shall be entitled to an 
absolute fee." There are no Michigan cases interpreting or apply-
ing this provision. Hence to determine the effect to be given this 
provision, recourse must be had to decisions in other states. 
(a). Jurisdictions other than Michigan. Only two states have 
dealt with this question, and their answers disagree. In New York, 
the statutory counterpart to Michigan's section 556.11 is given 
literal effect. The donee gets a common law fee; his elevated 
Remaindermen: A Study of New York Real Property Law Sections 149-153," 16 CoRN. 
L. Q. 447 at 462 (1931). 
20 49 N.Y. Co~ol. Laws. (McKinney, 1945) §§149-151. 
21 Wells, Admr. v. American Mortgage Company of Scotland, 109 Ala. 430, 20 S. 136 
(1896); Watkins v. French, 149 Okla. 205, 299 P. 900 (1931); Arnold v. McAuliffe, 201 
Okla. 639, 209 P. (2d) 866 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 950 (1950); Ruby v. Bishop, (10th 
Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 84; Ashton v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 201, 80 N.W. 
963 (1899); Larson v. Mardaus, 172 Minn. 48, 215 N.W. 196 (1927). 
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estate cuts off the reversion.22 In Alabama, however, although the 
same result is reached the interpretation of the statute is different. 
The statutory fee does not carry with it all the ownership of a 
common-law fee. The statutes are construed to enlarge the donee's 
interest to a fee only in favor of creditors of and purchasers from 
the donee23 and protect only express remainders when the power 
goes unexecuted, thus leaving reversions by operation of law un-
touched.24 It might be thought from this that in Alabama a 
donor who gives the donee a life estate and absolute power without 
limitation over would retain a reversion which, unaffected by the 
statutes under the Alabama view, would return the property to 
the donor's estate following the death of the donee-life tenant 
and absent any creditor attachment. But such is not the case. 
Alabama is one of the few states following the common-law minor-
ity rule that the grant of an absolute power of disposition to the 
donee of a life estate enlarged the estate to a fee. Since the statute 
is construed not to cover reversions, the minority common-law 
rule then operates, raising the tenant's interest to a fee and cutting 
off the reversion.25 
22Ryder v. Lott, 123 App. Div. 685, 108 N.Y.S. 46 (1908), affd. 199 N.Y. 543, 93 N.E. 
1131 (1910); Matter of Enright, 109 Misc. 337 at 341, 179 N.Y.S. 757 (1919); Matter of 
Neuwirth, 170 Misc. 57 at 58, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 623 (1939); In Te Lewis' Will, 107 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 607 at 609 (1951). 
For some purposes a donee in New York may still possess only a life estate. Matter 
of Sonnenburg, 133 Misc. 42, 231 N.Y.S. 191 (1928), involved a grant by a wife to her 
husband for life with an absolute power, and at his death, a limitation over of what, if 
anything, Temained to certain legatees. In a tax proceeding an order was entered taxing 
the husband on the theory that he had a life estate. The husband appealed, arguing that 
the New York elevation section gave him a fee and that he ought to have been taxed 
on that basis. (This meant that if and when the remaindermen's estates vested in pos-
session, the remaindermen would not be required to pay a transfer tax, a tax on the 
transfer of the entire fee having already been paid by the husband.) The court held 
that while the statute gave the husband a fee in respect to creditors and purchasers, it 
did not give him a fee for tax purposes. 
23 Alford's Admr. v. Alford's Admr., 56 Ala. 350 at 352 (1876). 
24 Hood v. Bramlett, 105 Ala. 660 at 663, 17 S. 105 (1895). 
25 Hood v. Bramlett, 105 Ala. 660 at 663, 17 S. 105 (1894); Manfredo v. Manfredo, 191 
Ala. 322 at 326-327, 68 S. 157 (1915); Jemison v. Brasher, 202 Ala. 578 at 582, 81 S. 80 
(1919); Azar v. Azar, 262 Ala. 547 at 550, 80 S. (2d) 277 (1955.) In Hood v. Bramlett, 
testator willed his property to his wife for life, at her death half of what remained to be 
willed as she wished, the other half to be sold by his executor, the proceeds to be dis-
tributed to certain legatees. The wife made no disposition of the property over which 
she had a power. In this action, plaintiff, testator's administrator, sued defendant in 
possession of that half of the property over which the wife had had the power (un-
executed by her). Plaintiff claimed the right to receive rent from the defendant on the 
theory that the property, not being disposed of by the wife, and not being given in 
limitation over, had reverted to the testator's estate. The court held for the defendant, 
finding that there was no reversion. Instead the wife had the fee in the property, not by 
virtue of the statute, but by virtue of the common law, the statute not being applicable in 
this situation. The court said, at 663-664, that the protection of the statute was confined to 
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Both interpretations seem incorrect. The New York view, 
which, as just stated, gives the statutory language literal applica-
tion, is certainly a permissible statutory interpretation. This 
interpretation seems to give the elevation section of the statute 
too much effect. As indicated in parts A and B of this comment, 
the elevation sections were enacted in aid of creditors alone. They 
are in pari materia, so the presence of "creditors and purchasers" 
should be a prerequisite to invocation of any of the sections. In 
the absence of a creditor's attachment or the donee's exercise of 
his power, therefore, the donor should get his property back via 
reversion. The statutory fee should not equal a common law fee.26 
Alabama, on the other hand, seems to give the statute too little 
effect. At the very least the lawmakers intended to abolish com-
pletely the common law rule on elevation and substitute a statu-
tory grant for creditors' protection instead. If the statute is inter-
preted not to provide for elevation in the case of reversions, which 
was the Alabama court's interpretation, then it would seem that 
there was to be none, the legislative determination being final 
and precluding resort to the common law. 
If the Michigan court elects to follow the Alabama interpreta-
tion, the question whether the reversion is cut off will be governed 
by the Michigan common law rule on elevation. It is necessary, 
therefore, to inquire what that rule is. 
remainders expressly limited after the life estate, citing the Alabama counterpart to 
Michigan's §556.11 in proof thereof. 
"But the ulterior estates thus protected must rest upon express limitations and 
not upon mere implication. This is demonstrated by [the elevation section] which 
provides that where no remainder is limited on the estate of the donee of the power, 
he is entitled to an absolute fee, thus confining the protection of future estates ••• 
to estates in remainder limited upon the particular estate, and leaving mere rever-
sions and remainders by implication - the antithesis of express limitation - exposed 
to the operation of the common law doctrine, which so far from being affected by 
our statutes .is confirmed and re-declared .•.. And this court has removed any doubt 
which might othenvise have clouded the point by declaring: 'A gift, conveyance 
or bequest, even when expressed to be for life, if coupled with a general power 
under which the whole fund may be disposed of, vests an absolute title in the first 
taker, which an implied remainder or reversion will not cut down to a life estate,' 
Adams v. Adams, 85 Ala. 452, 455. As to one-half of the land in question there was 
no limitation over, but at the most only an implied reversion, and the case is brought 
directly within the statutory provisions and general principles we have adverted 
to •••• " 
Thus the Alabama court uses statutory language literally applicable to facilitate an 
escape to the common law, which is then used to reach the same result which would 
have followed from a literal application of the statute. 
26 Minnesota, however, in its statutory revision, codified the New York interpretation. 
See Minn. Stat. (1957) §502.78. 
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(b). Michigan Law on Elevation. The Michigan decisions, 
dating from 1872, indicate that no ready answer can be given to 
this inquiry.27 The Michigan powers statutes were first enacted 
in 1846, appearing in that year's Revised Statutes. They have 
been in force continuously ever since but, strangely, although 
antedating the earliest of the decisions just referred to, were not 
mentioned by the court until 1944.28 The court must have become 
aware of the statutes at some earlier point, however, because it 
referred to them, in a somewhat different context, in a 1900 case.29 
In the first four cases, from 1872 to 1910, the court came out 
strongly for the minority rule that an unlimited power of disposi-
tion coupled with a life estate raised the estate to a fee. In Jones 
v. Jones and Dills v. La Tour, the court, finding the power to be 
unlimited, enlarged the life estate to a fee. In Gadd v. Stoner and 
Farlin v. Sanborn, the court found the powers there given to be 
limited to exercise only for the donee's comfort and support and 
held that such limited powers did not enlarge the life estate (in 
accordance with the usual statement of the common law minority 
rule).30 Then in 1910 came In re Moor's Estate, which, although 
not expressly overruling the previous decisions, was squarely con-
tradictory to them, holding that a life estate was not enlarged by 
an unlimited power and quoting the majority rule as set forth in 
a Connecticut case. In the next six cases, Bateman v. Case, White 
v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co., Laberteaux v. Gale, Drier v. 
Gracey, Wool-fit v. Preston, and Gibson v. Gibson, the court re-
turned to the minority rule. In the White and Gibson cases, the 
court found the power to be unlimited, and held the estate en-
larged to a fee. In the other four cases, the court found the power 
to be limited and left the estate unenlarged. Then, in 1930, Quar-
27 The following list is not exhaustive but contains most of the decisions: Jones v. 
Jones, 25 Mich. 401 (1872); Jones v. Deming, 91 Mich. 481, 51 N.W. 1119 (1892); Gadd 
v. Stoner, 113 Mich. 689, 71 N.W. 1111 (1897); Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich. 243, 98 N.W. 
1004 (1904); Farlin v. Sanborn, 161 Mich. 615, 126 N.W. 634 (1910); In re Moor's Estate, 
163 Mich. 353, 128 N.W. 198 (1910); Bateman v. Case, 170 Mich. 617, 136 N.W. 590 (1912); 
White v. Grand Rapids &: Indiana Ry. Co., 190 Mich. 1, 155 N.W. 719 (1916); Laberteaux 
v. Gale, 196 Mich. 150, 162 N.W. 968 (1917); Drier v. Gracey, 203 Mich. 399, 169 N.W. 
835 (1918); Woolfit v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918); Gibson v. Gibson, 
213 Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41 (1921); Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 
(1930); Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944); In re Peck Estates, 
320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14: (1948). Some of these cases are touched upon briefly in 
note, 29 MICH. L. REv. 761 (1931). 
28 The case which mentioned the statutes was Townsend v. -Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 
14: N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 
29 Hunt v. Hunt, 124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900). 
30 36 AL.R. 1177 (1925), 76 A.L.R. 1153 (1932); note, 29 MICH. L. R.Ev. 761 at 763 
(1931); note, 30 MICH. L. REv. 796 at 797 (1932). 
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ton v. Barton was decided. There was no question in this case 
that the power was unlimited; but the court, citing Ruling Case 
Law twice for the majority rule, held that the donee's power did 
not enlarge his life estate. There was no express reversal of the 
previous decisions favoring the minority rule. The court stated 
that the donor's (testator's) intent was paramount and then found 
that he intended a life estate. Finally, in 1944 the court in Town-
send v. Gordon at least recognized the existence of the Michigan 
powers statutes. But the statutes were cited almost as an after-
thought, the court placing major reliance on Farlin v. Sanborn, 
which it cited in support of the statement: 
"The general rule is that an indefinite or general power of 
appointment or disposition . . . carries with it a fee unless 
testator gave the donee an estate for life only by using certain 
express words annexing to it the power of disposal."31 
Construing a will in which testator had given his executor 
the residue of his estate to dispose of as he should determine, 
the court held that the executor took the fee. Its reliance on 
Farlin v. Sanborn is rather curious when it is remembered that 
Farlin involved a holding that a tenant's limited power did not 
enlarge his life estate. The Townsend case involved the grant of 
an indefinite, not a life, estate to the executor, plus an unlimited 
power. And on these facts it is uniformly held by courts follow-
ing either the majority or minority rule that the power creates 
a fee interest in the donee.32 So, while the result in Townsend 
is consistent with the common law, it is difficult to say what prin-
ciple the court announced or thought it was following. The most 
recent pronouncement of the court came in In re Peck Estates, 
decided in 1948. Testatrix had willed property to a trustee to 
hold in trust and pay the income to her nephew for life, the nephew 
having a power to appoint the corpus by will, remainders over 
in case of failure to appoint. It was argued that by virtue of Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948) section 556.9 the nephew had held a fee 
interest which he had tried to convey to his trustee in bankruptcy 
when he underwent voluntary bankruptcy, such being an execu-
tion of the power. The court decided that the nephew had not 
held a fee interest under the statute because of one of two factors 
(it is uncertain which the court relied on): either the power was 
not "absolute" within the meaning of section 556.13, being limited 
31 Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438 at 447, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 
32 Note II supra. 
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to exercise only by will, or else the donee's estate was accompanied 
by a disqualifying trust.33 This decision is thus one based entirely 
on the Michigan powers statutes and does not bear on the Mich-
igan common law at all. That law is unpredictable. 
2. Tax Effects: Federal Estate Tax 
Property over which a donee has an absolute power of disposi-
tion will doubtless be includible in the donee's gross estate for 
federal estate tax purposes, but not because of the state elevation 
statutes. These are not necessary to the result. The definition in 
section 2041 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of a power which 
will be included in the gross estate is broader than the definition 
of "absolute power" in the state statutes. Therefore the federal 
government will not have to rely on elevation in order to require 
inclusion. 
But a question does arise whether the grant of an absolute 
power of disposition to a spouse will qualify for the marital de-
duction under section 2056 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code on 
the theory that statutory elevation gives the donee-spouse a fee 
interest in the property.34 The common law elevation rules have 
been applied in determining marital deduction qualification.35 
The question is whether the elevation statutes will go as far as 
the minority common law rule, which raised the donee's estate 
to a fee for all purposes. The only decision on the point, Estate 
of Pipe v. Commissioner,36 suggests that in a proper case the 
court might hold the statute applicable and allow the gift to the 
donee to qualify for the marital deduction. There a testator had 
given his wife personalty for life, with a full power of disposition. 
The testator had directed, however, that his wife was to have no 
power to dispose of what remained unexpended at her death, 
this residue going in limitation over.37 It was argued that that 
testator's devise to his wife qualified for the marital deduction, 
33 In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692 at 700, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948). 
34 In certain cases, a grant of a life estate and power of appointment to a spouse will 
escape the terminable interest disqualification and will be deductible. I.R.C., §§2056 (b) 
(1) and 2056 (b) (5). The question now raised, however, is not that of squeezing in 
under §2056 (b) (5) - the escape valve of the terminable interest provision - but rather 
that of altogether avoiding classification as a terminable interest. 
35 Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 at 44 (1954), affd. (9th Cir. 1956) 237 
F. (2d) 345; Estate of Harriet C. Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710 at 712 (1957); Estate of Wallace C. 
Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 at 1194-1195 (1957). 
36 (2d Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 210, cert. den. 355 U.S. 814 (1957). 
37 Id. at 211. 
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one of the contentions being that under the New York elevation 
statute the wife took a fee. The court quoted the statute but 
refused to apply it on the ground that the wife did not have the 
requisite "absolute power" since she was forbidden to dispose of 
the property by will.38 This outcome suggests that if the court 
had found an absolute power, it would have been willing to apply 
the statute and allow the deduction. 
On the basis of New York law, allowing the gift of an absolute 
power of disposition to a spouse to qualify for the marital deduc-
tion might be the correct decision. New York, it will be remem-
bered, takes a broad view of the fee interest created by its statute. 
But, to repeat, this does not seem to be the correct view. The 
elevation statutes are supposed to protect creditors and purchasers, 
and the taxing sovereign is neither. Nor would it be protected 
by applying the statute; it would lose money. If the elevation 
sections cannot be used to qualify the gift to a spouse for the 
marital deduction, the gift can not be qualified in any other 
way because it will be a terminable interest, and disqualified 
under section 2056 (b) (I) of the code. And this seems to be the 
sounder view of the elevation statutes; they should protect creditors 
and purchasers but not a testator seeking to reduce taxes through 
the marital deduction.39 
D. Statutory Interpretation: When Will the Statute Apply? 
I. Absolute Power 
Following the three elevation sections are definitions of "abso-
lute power." The primary definition emphasizes that the power 
must be one exercisable inter vivos: "Every power of disposition 
shall be deemed absolute, by means of which the grantee is enabled 
in his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit."40 
This definition excludes from the category of "absolute" a power 
exercisable only by will. So, generally, if the power is testamen-
tary only, the elevation section will not apply. But a secondary 
definition of absolute power makes room for the exceptional case. 
In some cases a power exercisable only by will can be considered 
absolute within the meaning of the preceding elevation sections: 
38 Id. at 212. 
39 It is recognized, however, that a federal court sitting in New York would, under 
the Erie Railroad doctrine, be obliged to follow the New York courts' interpretation of the 
elevation sections. 
40 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.13. 
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<(When a general and beneficial power to devise the inheri-
tance, shall be given to a tenant for life or for years, such 
tenant shall be deemed to possess an absolute power of dis-
position, within the meaning, and subject to the provisions 
of the three (3) last preceding sections.''41 
(a). Primary Definition. (1 ). Power to devise as well as 
convey'! The primary definition commands that an absolute power 
must be one exercisable inter vivos. But what happens if the 
power is restricted to exercise inter vivos? Can it still be absolute 
when not exercisable by will as well? A strict reading of the 
definition suggests an affirmative answer. The donee need only 
be able to dispose of the entire fee in his lifetime for his own 
benefit, which he could do even though his power were restricted 
to exercise inter vivos. And this view has support in some state 
courts. While they have not explicitly held that a power to devise 
is unnecessary, they have found an absolute power and applied the 
elevation statutes, despite the absence of a power to devise.42 New 
York, however, appears to be contra, requiring that an absolute 
power include a power to dispose by will.48 
, (2). What conditions can an absolute power tolerate'! Often 
the power given to a donee is one to "sell and dispose" of the 
property.44 This can be construed as a power to dispose for a 
consideration, but not gratuitously. So construed, is the power 
still absolute? Oklahoma says yes;45 Wisconsin says no, refusing 
to apply the elevation statutes in such a case.46 Oklahoma's position 
seems to be the sounder. Although a donee cannot give property 
away, nev~rtheless, if he can sell it and consume all the proceeds 
during his lifetime (and there is nothing to prevent him from so 
doing),47 he has disposed of the entire fee for his own benefit 
during his lifetime. 
41 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.12. 
42Reeves v. Tatum, 233 Ala. 455 at 457-458, 172 S. 247 (1937); Gentle v. Frederick, 234 
Ala. 184, 174 S. 606 (1937); Will of Zweiful, 194 Wis. 428 at 436-437, 216 N.W. 840 (1927). 
4BRose v. Hatch, 55 Hun (N.Y.) 457, 8 N.Y.S. 720 at 723 (1890); Terry v. Wiggins, 
47 N.Y. 512 at 516 (1872). In the former case it was said: " ..• but the power ..• 
was to be exercised during his life, and therefore the power was not absolute, within 
the meaning of the law, because such a power includes a power of disposal by will." 
44 As just stated, such a power does not include a power to devise; but on what seems 
the sounder view this omission is harmless. It will not take the power out of the "abso-
lute" category. 
45 Ruby v. Bishop, (10th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 84 at 89-91. 
46 Estate of Holmes, 233 Wis. 274 at 279, 289 N.W. 638 (1940). 
47 None of the elevation statutes specify that the proceeds resulting from exercise 
of the power shall be held subject to the limitation over. West Virginia, however, at one 
time had a statute which so provided. See note, 37 W. VA. L.Q. 422 at 424-425 (1931). 
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Often the donee receives a power of disposition for his comfort 
or support. Is this power, so limited and qualified and conditional, 
still absolute? At common law it was not, and states following 
the minority common law elevation rule never raised the donee's 
estate to a fee when his power was limited to exercise for his 
support.48 It would seem proper to continue this approach under 
the elevation statutes, and some states have done so.49 Nevertheless, 
there are other states which have found the power to be absolute 
and applied the elevation statutes without noticing the problem 
posed by the limitation on the exercise of the power.50 
(b). Secondary Definition. (1). Ingredients. Even though 
a power does not fall within the primary definition of absolute 
power because restricted to testamentary execution, it can still 
be an absolute power within the meaning of the elevation sections 
provided it fulfills the requirements of the secondary definition. 
It must be a " ... general and beneficial power to devise the inheri-
tance . . . given to a tenant for life or for years. . . . "51 The word 
"inheritance" probably means "the remainder" or "the fee" and 
thus would not exclude from the definition a power created inter 
vivos. In Hume v. Randall,52 for example, the secondary defini-
tion was used in an inter vivos setting. Grantors had by deed 
given interests to the grantees and the survivor of them, with a 
right to convey the fee by will. There was no limitation over. 
The court said that the secondary definition of absolute power 
applied.53 
The meaning of "general" power is fixed by the statute: "A 
power is general, where it authorizes the alienation in fee ... to 
any alienee whatever."54 When there is no restriction on the 
power, and the appointees are left to the donee's discretion, the 
power would seem to be a general one.55 
48 Note 30 supra. 
49 Yockers v. Hackmeyer, 203 Ala. 621 at 622-623, 84 S. 709 (1919); Terry v. Wiggins, 
47 N.Y. 512 at 516 (1872); In the Matter of the Estate of Brower, 278 App. Div. 851, 
104 N.Y.S. (2d) 658 (1951), affd. 304 N.Y. 661, 107 N.E. (2d) 589 (1952). 
50 Larsen and Another v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 300 at 308-309, 47 N.W. 615 (1890); Larson 
v. Mardaus, 172 Minn. 48, 215 N.W. 196 (1927); Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235 at 
240-241, 14 N.W. (2d) 360 (1944); Rise v. Park, 222 Minn. 444, 24 N.W. (2d) 831 (1946). 
51 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.12. 
52141 N.Y. 499, 36 N.E. 402 (1894). 
53 Id. at 504. 
54 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.5. 
55 But see Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 221 N.W. 401 (1928). Testator's will set 
up trusts for his daughters for their lives, giving the daughters each a power to appoint 
a portion of the principal by will with limitations over, in the absence of appointment, 
on termination of the trusts. Held, at 135, the powers were not absolute within the 
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The most significant part of the secondary definition of abso-
lute power is the word "beneficial." The meaning of "beneficial" 
power is likewise fixed by statute: "A . . . power is beneficial 
when no person other than the grantee has, by the terms of its 
creation any interest in its execution."56 It is crucial to know, 
therefore, when other parties, by virtue of the instrument creating 
the power, are interested in its execution. Certainly if the power 
was "in trust" within the meaning of section 556.22 it could not 
be beneficial, since persons would be designated as entitled to 
the proceeds resulting from execution of the power and would 
be interested in its execution. What if the "interest" is expressed 
less directly-what of remaindermen? Some cases have decided 
that remaindermen are interested parties. These courts say that 
when the donor limits remainders after the donee's estate, to take 
effect in the absence of exercise of the power, there are parties 
interested in the execution of the power, which therefore cannot 
be beneficial.57 Another court has, however, ignored the impact 
of remainders, never mentioning that they might constitute 
"interest."58 
Under the primary definition of absolute power the fact 
that remainders are limited over does not matter because the 
definition nowhere requires an absolute power to be a beneficial 
power. It says simply that a power is absolute if the donee 
can dispose of the entire fee in his lifetime for his own benefit. 
It is understandable that some courts, because of this somewhat 
duplicative terminology ("beneficial" versus "benefit"), can assert 
that an absolute power (under the primary definition) must be 
both general and beneficial.59 But this is clearly incorrect. A 
donee, in order to have an absolute power under the primary 
definition, must be able to dispose for his own benefit. But this 
does not mean that his power must be beneficial. These are 
altogether different propositions. So even if the secondary defi-
meaning of the secondary definition. They were not "general," because they embraced 
interests less than a fee. 
56 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.7. 
57 Michigan has so decided in In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692 at 701, 32 N.W. (2d) 
14 (1948). Other decisions are Yockers v. Hackmeyer, 203 Ala. 621 at 623, 84 S. 709 (1919); 
Rose v. Hatch, 55 Hun (N.Y.) 457, 8 N.Y.S. 720 at 722 (1890). 
58 Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 221 N.W. 401 (1928). 
59 See, e.g., Yockers v. Hackmeyer, 203 Ala. 621 at 623, 84 S. 709 (1919); and Weinstein 
v. Weber, 58 App. Div. 112 at 116, 68 N.Y.S. 570 (1901), affd. 78 App. Div. 645, 81 N.Y.S. 
62 (1903), affd. 178 N.Y. 94 (1904), in which the court admonished that in order for the 
elevation section to be applicable, it must be found that ". . • the power • • • is both 
general and beneficial." 
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nition cannot be used where there are remainders, the primary 
definition can. Indeed, the elevation sections therpselves, which 
transform an absolute power into ownership, expressly allude to 
the possibility of remainders being limited over by saying that 
the donee gets a fee ". . . subject to any future estates limited 
thereon .... " 60 But if the only power given is a power to devise, 
which will never fit the primary definition, it cannot, in most 
states, qualify as absolute unless the donor refrains from limiting 
remainders after the donee's estate. 
The conclusion is that if remainders constitute interest, the 
utility of the secondary definition of absolute power is drastically 
curtailed. It will be a rare case which can take advantage of the 
secondary definition; 61 almost always, in a well planned disposition 
of property, there will be a remainder limited after the donee's 
estate to take effect if the power goes unexercised. To hold that 
such remainders constitute "interest" is to vitiate the statutory 
purpose; creditors would thus in most instances be robbed of the 
statute's protective elevation. The statute requires interest to be 
indicated by the terms of the instrument creating the power. From 
this it seems likely that the legislative intent was that an explicit 
designation of interest be made before a power became non-
beneficial. 
(2). Peculiar decisions in the trust context. A situation which 
often provokes a question of the application of the secondary defi-
nition is that in which the donor gives property on trust for the 
donee-beneficiary's life, the donee having a testamentary power to 
appoint the corpus. As will appear later, this kind of situation 
is one specifically excluded from the elevation statutes because 
of the accompanying trust. Several courts, however, have reached 
the same result, in a more labored and questionable manner, by 
holding the requirements of the secondary definition of absolute 
power unfulfilled. The Michigan court, for example, has decided, 
keeping its concepts of estates and trusts rigidly distinct, that a 
trust beneficiary with the power to appoint by will was not a 
"tenant for life or years" as the secondary definition requires him 
to be. Hence the secondary definition could not be used and the 
elevation sections could not be applied. 62 The New York decision 
60 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.9. 
61 One such rare case was Thompson v. Young, 215 Ala. 603, ll2 S. 241 (1927), in which 
the court applied the secondary definition. 
62 Hunt v. Hunt, 124 Mich. 502 at 505-506, 83 N.W. 371 (1900). 
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of Cutting v. Cutting63 has been interpreted as having reached a 
similar result; the secondary definition could not be applied be-
cause the donee, a trust beneficiary, did not have an estate.64 
With these decisions should be compared Cawker v. Dreutzer,65 
which held that a trust beneficiary's power to appoint the corpus 
could not be considered "general," and hence not within the 
secondary definition, because the power embraced an interest less 
than a fee. 
2. Disqualifying Trusts 
If the power given to the donee is accompanied by a disquali-
fying trust, the elevation statutes will not apply.66 When is there 
such a disqualifying trust? 
(a). Express Trusts. There are two types of cases: those in 
which the donee of the power is himself a trustee (the donee-
trustee case) and those in which the donee is a trust beneficiary 
(the donee-beneficiary case). In the former case the power may 
be either one of appointment or of disposition, but it is more 
likely to be a power of disposition. In the latter case the power 
will be a power of appointment, for seldom will a power of sale 
or disposition be given a trust beneficiary. It might be thought 
that only in the donee-trustee situation is the power accompanied 
by a trust within the meaning of the statute. There the power 
does seem to be accompanied by a trust, while in the donee-bene-
ficiary situation it would seem that the trust accompanies not the 
power but only the property affected by the power.67 
Nevertheless, the only two jurisdictions in which the question 
has been raised have held that the donee-beneficiary situation 
does involve a disqualifying trust. In New York this result is 
reached in two ways. First, the New York cases reveal that the 
power of a trust beneficiary to appoint the corpus will not be 
considered absolute, since there is always some kind of restraint 
on a trust beneficiary's power of alienation. Only an absolute 
power elevates, and the slightest restraint on the donee's power 
of alienation during his lifetime will serve to disqualify a power 
63 86 N.Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 (1881). 
64FoWLER, REAL PROPERTY LAW m; NEW YORK 361 (1889). 
65197 Wis. 98 at 135, 221 N.W. 401 (1928). 
66 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.9. 
67 This was argued in Whiteside and Edelstein, "Life Estates with Power to Consume: 
Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and Remaindermen: A Study of New York Real Property 
Law Sections 149-153," 16 CoRN. L.Q. 447 at 466, n. 60 (1931). 
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from the category of absolute. Therefore, when the appointment 
can become effective only after termination of the trust at the 
death of the beneficiary (meaning that the donee cannot appoint 
his life estate and presently vest possession in his appointee),68 
or when the donee is forbidden to anticipate income from the 
trust,69 his power is not absolute and his estate not' changed by 
the statute. Second, the New York courts have decided that in 
both the donee-trustee70 and the donee-bene:ficiary71 situations, 
there are accompanying trusts which prevent the elevation section 
from operating. 
In Alabama there are no cases discussing the question whether 
the power of a donee-bene:ficiary is absolute. But, as in New 
York, the power of a donee-beneficiary is held to be one accom-
panied by a trust, the elevation statute being rendered inap-
plicable.72 Nor is there elevation in the donee-trustee situation, 
although the reason is in some doubt because the only case on 
the point may be taken more than one way.73 
68 Farmers' Loan 8: Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266 at Zl7-278, 85 N.E. 59 (1908); 
Hume v. Randall, 141 N.Y. 499 at 505, 36 N.E. 402 (1894), interpreting Cutting v. Cutting, 
86 N.Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 (1881) and Genet v. Hunt, 113 N.Y. 158, 21 N.E. 91 (1889). 
See also Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N.Y. 421 at 433-435 (1884). 
69 Woodbridge v. Bockes, 59 App. Div. 503 at 514, 69 N.Y.S. 417 (1901), affd. 170 
N.Y. 596, 63 N.E. 362 (1902). 
10 Haynes v. Sherman, 117 N.Y. 433 at 438, 22 N.E. 938 (1889). 
71 Rose v. Hatch, 55 Hun (N.Y.) 457, 8 N.Y .S. 720 at 722-723 (1890); Higgins v. 
Downs, IOI App. Div. 119 at 123, 91 N.Y.S. 937 (1905); FoWLER, REAL PROPERTY I.Aw OF 
NEW YoRK 354 (1899), citing Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 (1881). 
72 In Morgan County Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Nelson, 244 Ala. 374, 13 S. (2d) 765 
(1943), the court construed a will which in part gave property to one Nelson to be used 
for the support, maintenance, and benefit of the testator's sister-in-law, any part remain-
ing undisposed of at the time of the beneficiary's death to go to certain remaindermen. 
The court recognized that the will -rather obliquely gave a power of disposition. One 
question was whether the beneficiary's life estate was elevated by the powers statute 
to a fee. The court found that the statute did not apply, saying at 380: "If there were 
no trust created, a power of sale ••• would exist in [the beneficiary] ••.• But in the 
instant case there is a trust attempted to be set up. The sale is to be for a certain pur-
pose. Those statutes do not apply here." This case is -rather unsatisfactory, however, 
because the will did not quite indicate who was the donee of the power-whether the 
trustee or the beneficiary - and the court studiously avoided resolving this ambiguity. 
73 This was Nabors v. Woolsey, 174 Ala. 289, 56 S. 533 (1911). Testator gave his 
daughter certain realty for life, authorizing her to sell or dispose for reinvestment, the 
proceeds to be held and treated the same as was the original property. The daughter was 
also empowered to dispose of the property by will, but if she did not, it was to descend 
to her heirs. There were thus two powers here: one exercisable inter vivos and the other 
exercisable by will. On the question whether the first power was enough to give the 
daughter a fee, the court, at 292, decided that the daughter " ••• did not get a fee .•• 
for the reason that she was not given the absolute power of disposition, as the power 
to sell was accompanied with a trust." This could be a holding that the elevation 
statute did not apply since the power was accompanied with a disqualifying trust. On 
the other hand, it could be a holding that the elevation statute did not apply since the 
power was not absolute, being accompanied with a trust. 
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In Michigan it is reasonably certain that the elevation statute 
does not operate in the donee-beneficiary situation-although the 
precise reason why this is so is in some doubt.74 
From the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that any time a 
donor wants to prevent the elevation. sections from operating, he 
need merely give his property in trust, limited to last until an 
appointment takes effect.75 
(b). Implied Trusts: Remainders and the Accompanying 
Trust. Remainders are usually limited after the life estate of the 
donee of the power, and in most cases the donor stipulates that 
these limitations over are to take effect only if the power goes 
unexercised. When the power is to appoint, there could never 
be any question of the power's being accompanied by a trust in 
favor of the remaindermen. Their interests. are in terms made 
subject to divestment by the donee's execution of his power; 
they are takers in default. But suppose the donor gives to a life 
tenant a power, not to appoint, but to sell or consume, with re-
J?1ainder over to somebody else. Since there is no expression that 
the remainder is limited over in the event that the power goes 
unexecuted, might it not be that the power is to be exercised for 
the benefit of the remaindermen? That is to say, is there not a 
danger that a court would find that the power was affected by an 
implied trust-a trust of the proceeds of sale or disposal for the 
benefit of the remaindermen? If a court adopted this attitude, 
741n re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948), testatrix had devised 
property to a trustee to hold in trust and pay the income to her nephew for life, the 
nephew having a power to appoint the corpus by will, remainders limited over in case 
of failure to appoint. It was argued that the elevation section converted the nephew's 
interest into a fee. The court found the statute inapplicable, holding that the nephew's 
interest remained a life tenancy. The court's brief statement on the application of the 
statute came at 700: ". . . the power of disposition was accompanied by a trust in favor 
of [the nephew], the provisions of which gave him the power to dispose of the corpus 
of the estate by will. His power was limited to disposing of the corpus by will effective 
at his death." This may be a holding that the power was not absolute since it was exer-
cisable only by will. [And the secondary definition could not be applied to make the 
power absolute because of the holding in Hunt v. Hunt, 124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 
1900).] On the other hand, it may be a holding that the elevation section could not 
be applied since the power was accompanied by a disqualifying trust. The significance 
of the trust was argued to the court. See the appellate briefs filed in the case in 3777 
Supreme Court Records and Briefs, January Term, 1948. 
75 No ready explanation can be offered as to why the authors of this legislation pro-
\,jded so easy a means of avoiding the statute and defeating creditors: at common law 
the fact that a general power was accompanied by some sort of trust did not preclude 
creditors from reaching appointive property after the power was exercised. See the 
discussion in Whiteside and Edelstein, "Life Estates with Power To Consume: Rights of 
Creditors, Purchasers and Remaindermen: A Study of New York Real Property Law 
Sections 149-153,'' 16 CORN. L.Q. 447 at 466-467 (1931). 
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it would then have to hold that the life tenant's estate was not 
enlarged by the elevation statute because of the accompanying 
trust. 
Such was the view of the appellate division in New York at 
one time. In Weinstein v. Weber,76 the court made a finding of 
trust solely because it thought that the limitations over must mean 
something-must be protected against destruction by the power. 
Accordingly, it held that the proceeds resulting from exercise of 
the power of sale took the place of the appointive property, on a 
type of trust res analogy.77 
If the meaning of this decision was that a power would always 
be accompanied by a trust when a remainder was limited after 
the donee's life estate, the decision was clearly in error. It ignored 
the historical context of the elevation statutes-the common-law 
elevation rules. The rules, it will be remembered, had developed 
in response to this type of case. The majority view was that the 
life estate would be controlling, that the absolute power would 
not enlarge the tenant's interest. The minority view was that the 
power enlarged the tenant's life estate to a fee. State legislatures, 
in order to resolve this common-law conflict and to protect credi-
tors, enacted the elevation sections, which provided that the 
tenant's estate was to be enlarged to a fee in respect of creditors. 
It is therefore to just such a case as Weinstein that the elevation 
sections were designed to apply. 
The apparent error of Weinstein was rectified in Manion v. 
Peoples Bank of ]ohnstown.18 Testatrix had left property to her 
son for life " ... with the absolute power of disposition ... ," 
remainder over to another son.79 The trial court found a dis-
qualifying trust, relying on Weinstein. It felt that the donee had 
no right to dispose of the property for his own benefit. Despite 
the donor's use of the statutory language, the court said there 
was a complete lack of indication of intent to defeat the remain-
ders; they were to go to the remaindermen undiminished.80 The 
trial court's decision was affirmed by the appellate division81 but 
76 58 App. Div. 112, 68 N.Y.S. 570 (1901), affd. 78 App. Div. 645, 81 N.Y.S. 62 (1903), 
affd. 178 N.Y. 94 (1904). 
77 Id. at 116. 
78 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 484 (1942), affd. 266 App. Div. 1043, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 593 (1943), revd. 
292 N.Y. 317, 55 N.E. (2d) 46 (1944). 
79 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 484 at 487. 
so Id. at 488-489. 
81266 App. Div. 1043, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 593 (1943). 
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reversed by the court of appeals,82 which decided that the donor, 
in using the language of the statute, was trying to do exactly what 
it allowed him to do-to give the donee a fee interest: 
"The life estate left by the testatrix to [ the life tenant] was 
to be held by him-so her will _said-with the 'absolute power 
of disposition.' The quoted phrase presumably was patterned 
after section 149 of the Real Property Law [New York's ele-
vation statute], so as to bring about the result dictated by that 
section.''83 
The Manion case seems to have laid the Weinstein decision, with 
its notion of implied trust, to rest. 
IL EXECUTION OF A POWER OF APPOINTMENT 
A. History, Purpose, and Effect 
The Michigan statutes governing execution of a power are 
sections 556.40 to 556.47. Attention here will be focused on two 
of these sections, which are as follows: 
"No power can be executed except by some instrument 
in writing, which would be sufficient in law to pass the estate 
or interest intended to pass under the power, if the person 
executing the power were the actual owner.84 
"Every instrument, except a will, made in execution of a 
power ... shall be deemed a conveyance within the meaning 
and subject to the provisions of the next succeeding 
chapter.''85 
The general purpose of these sections is manifestly to set forth 
exactly the manner in which a power must be executed and the 
formalities which need, and need not, be observed. 
It may be suggested that these provisions, far from subjecting 
an executing instrument to formal conveyancing requirements, 
prescribe instead that any such instrument shall be "deemed" to 
have met these requirements, thus obviating compliance there-
with. Statutory history and statutes from other jurisdictions in-
dicate that their purpose is plainly to make compliance with 
formal conveyancing requirements mandatory to an effective exe-
82 292 N.Y. 317, 55 N.E. (2d) 46 (1944). 
83 Id. at 320-321. 
84 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.40. 
85 Id., §556.41. 
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cution of a power. In Alabama, for instance, the relevant section 
says: 
"No power of disposition of real estate can be executed, 
except by an instrument in writing, which would be sufficient 
in law to pass the estate or interest intended to pass under 
such power, if the person executing the power was the actual 
owner."86 
This section is substantially identical to Michigan's section 556.40. 
Alabama has no provision corresponding to section 556.41, and 
thus no confusion resulting from the word "deemed." It is then 
quite obvious that in Alabama formal conveyancing requirements 
are imposed on executions of a power. In New York this is plainer 
yet. New York likewise has no provision like Michigan's "deemed" 
statute and its statute says flatly: 
"A power can be executed only by a written instrument, 
which would be sufficient to pass the estate, or interest, in-
tended to pass under the power, if the person executing the 
power were the actual owner."87 
Where, then, did Michigan get its "deemed" provision? The New 
York powers statutes as originally enacted in 1829 contained such 
a provmon. Michigan borrowed it in 1846 when it enacted its 
powers statutes. The New York statutes were amended in 1896 
and the "deemed" provision then deleted. Of the original New 
York provisions, the New York revisers said: 
" 'They rest on the principle, that the alienation of lands 
by means of a power should be governed by the same rules 
as their alienation by the legal owner; and where the general 
solemnities of law are observed, other formalities, though 
enjoined by the party, may be considered as immaterial, and 
may be safely disregarded ... .' "88 
86 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §82. 
87 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §165. 
88 This comment of the New York revisers was quoted in 27 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) 
169 by Professor Oliver S. Rundell, Dean and Professor Emeritus of the Wisconsin School 
of Law, in his introductory comment to the Wisconsin powers statutes, taken from the 
New York statutes and including a "deemed" statute, §232.39. The source given for 
the quotation was N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., Vol. III, p. 52. Professor Rundell first stated 
that the execution of a power was not a conveyance at common law, but merely a 
condition of the vesting of an interest created by the donor of the power. Since it was 
not a conveyance, it did not have to conform to any formal requirements of transfer. 
But since the effect of execution of a power resembled the effect of a conveyance, 
the New York revisers saw fit to "deem" the execution a conveyance and apply to it the 
usual conveyancing requirements. 
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It therefore appears that a correct reading of section 556.41 is that 
it decrees that instruments in execution of a power, although 
heretofore not conveyances, shall be "deemed" conveyances, and 
since deemed such, consequently subjected to conveyancing re-
quirements as set forth in other Michigan statutes. 
It should be carefully noted that these requirements in all 
probability include recordation, at least when the power relates 
to realty.89 
Examples of the strictness with which the courts compel the 
conveyancing requirements to be observed are Rutledge v. Cramp-
ton90 and In re Hayes' Will.91 In Rutledge, the holder of a life 
estate had a power to sell, and it was argued that she had executed 
the power by joining with another party (who had a half interest 
in the property) in a petition to the probate court for sale of the 
land. The Alabama statutes · commanded that execution of a 
power be by instrument sufficient to pass the estate in law and 
that conveyances of land had to be in writing, subscribed to, and 
attested by one witness who in tum had to sign. The court held 
the purported execution defective, referring to a New Yark case 
in which it was said that neither the life-tenant's assent to a sale in 
her answer, nor her approval endorsed on the draft of the decree, 
could be regarded as a valid execution. The court warned: "We 
have a statute ... prescribing how powers must be exercised, and 
there is no latitude for the courts to uphold any exercise thereof 
short of a substantial compliance with the statute."92 
In the Hayes' Will case, testator gave a legatee a life estate 
with power of sale. The executor sold the land. The legatee 
did not sign the contract of sale nor did she join in the deed. All 
she did was to sign a receipt given the purchaser by the executor 
for a payment made as a binder. Signing the binder was not an 
execution of the power, said the court, remonstrating that" ... a 
power of sale can only be exercised by an instrument of equal 
dignity, namely, a written conveyance in the form prescribed by 
sections 165 and 242 of the Real Property Law."93 
89 See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.40, 556.41, and 565.1; 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1945) §§165, 290, and 291; FOWLER, REAL PROPERTY LAW OF NEW YoRK 379 
(1899). There does not, it must be confessed, seem to be a need for recording executions 
of powers. 
90 150 Ala. 275, 43 S. 822 (1907). 
91114 N.Y.S. (2d) 87 (1952). 
92150 Ala. 275 at 283-284, 43 S. 822 (1907). 
98114 N.Y.S. (2d) 87 at 90 (1952). 
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B. Application to Personalty and Choses in Action 
The important question is whether the court will follow the 
statutory prescription that an instrument executing a power must 
conform to conveyancing requirements when the power being 
executed is over the corpus of a trust consisting of money, stocks, 
bonds, and other choses in action. The statutes apply, in terms, 
only to realty.94 It might be surmised that there is, therefore, 
no statute law covering powers relating to personalty or choses. 
But in Townsend v. Gordon,95 the Michigan court decided that 
the Michigan powers statutes applied to personalty. Other states 
have reached the same result.96 It may well be that the same de-
cision will be reached with respect to choses. In In re Peck 
Estates,97 the Michigan court voiced no objection to applying the 
powers statutes to a power over a trust corpus.98 Yet a New York 
case seems to hold that no formal requirements will be imposed 
at all for the execution of powers over personalty or choses. In 
In re Manville's Will,99 testator willed his residuary estate to 
trustees to hold in trust for certain beneficiaries, one-third thereof 
". . . to or for the use of such charitable institutions or purposes 
as his trustees might select and designate in their absolute and 
uncontrolled discretion."100 No payment was made by the trustees; 
but they did write to plaintiff, a charitable institution, saying that 
"We shall designate your organization to receive ... the principal 
and/or income funds at the earliest moment from the 
Trust .... "101 Plaintiff petitioned to compel the trustees to 
make payment, alleging also that it had been advised orally that 
it was selected and designated as the beneficiary. The trustees 
argued that there was no valid execution of the power of selection 
and designation since the New York statute had not been complied 
with. The court found that there had been no execution of the 
power because the letter to plaintiff connoted that future action 
would be taken to select and designate, but disagreed with the 
94 E.g., Mich. Comp Laws (1948) §556.2. 
95 308 Mich. 438 at 447, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 
96Alabama: Alford's Admr. v. Alford's Admr., 56 Ala. 350 at 353-355 (1876); New 
York: Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. (20 Hun 360) 522 at 544-547 (1881); Wisconsin: Caw-
ker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98 at 131-132, 221 N.W. 401 (1928). 
97 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948). 
98 Neither of these cases, however, concerned the application of the statutory require-
ments for execution of a power. 
99 ll7 N.Y.S. (2d) 220 (1952). 
100 Id. at 225. 
101 Id at 224. 
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trustees' argument that the statute on execution had to be com-
plied with: 
"The Court, however, is not in ac-cord with the view that 
. . . the power of selection and designation ... could be exer-
cised only by a duly acknowledged instrument in writing .... 
"The provisions of section 165 of the Real Property Law 
do not prescribe the same form of instrument to exercise a 
power to dispose of personal property as would be required 
with respect to real property under Sections 242 and 243 of 
the Real Property Law. Under Section 165 ... it would 
therefore appear that the exercise of such power in so far as 
related to income could be accomplished by the delivery of 
a written instrument signed by the trustees even though it 
were not acknowledged or recorded pursuant to Section 32 
of the Personal Property Law relating to assignments of in-
terests in decedents' estates."102 
It would seem to follow from this statement that in New York 
execution of a power over income or personalty will not be saddled 
with the formal requirements for transfer thereof. The case is 
not very authoritative, however, being only the opinion of one 
surrogate. 
In the event a court decides that the execution of powers over 
choses or personalty must conform to the legal requirements for 
transfer thereof, what impact would such a decision have upon 
powers in the trust context? It might well be asked how a donee 
of a power over a trust corpus would ever validly execute his 
power. The beneficiary does not have legal title; how can he 
accomplish a legal transfer? 
Yet perhaps the execution statutes can, on a reasonable view, 
be workably applied to the trust situation. Section 556.40 of the 
Michigan statute states: "No power can be executed except by 
some instrument in writing, which would be sufficient in law to 
pass the estate or interest intended to pass under the power, if 
the person executing the power were the actual owner." (Empha-
sis added.) The stance of this section is hypothetical; it recognizes 
that the donee usually has no title to the property and commands 
him to execute the power by a document which, if he owned the 
property, would transfer it. The facts that the donee does not 
own the property and cannot commit the acts of transfer are 
unimportant; indeed, such is usually the case, as the statute recog-
102 Id. at 228-229. Emphasis added. 
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nizes. Thus the question becomes what kind of instruments need 
to be written by the donee to execute the power. If the property 
involved were land, then the instrument would need to conform 
to the requirements for transferring land-namely, a duly executed 
deed of the land or an instrument executed in the same manner 
as a deed declaring the donee's intention to appoint described 
land to designated appointees. 
An inter vivos transfer of personal property ordinarily does 
not require a writing if the requirement of delivery is satisfied. 
Whether a court would permit an appointment of personalty by 
means of an informal delivery by a donee is a difficult question 
in view of the statutory purpose to authenticate executions. But, 
wholly apart from this question, such a method of transfer is 
obviously fraught with risks that should be avoided; prudence 
demands some kind of documentation. It has always been recog-
nized that a gift of personalty can be made by deed-an instrument 
duly authenticated by compliance with whatever requirements a 
particular jurisdiction ,may impose. It may safely be assumed that 
an instrument authenticated in the manner required for convey-
ances of land would be accepted by the courts as an effective ap-
pointment of personalty under the statute.103 It would also fore-
close any possible argument that an instrument valid at the time 
of appointment would be rendered invalid by a change in the 
kind of property constituting the corpus of trust occurring after 
execution of the power and before the termination of the trust. 
Thus a deed, or something like it, would execute a power over 
any kind of property ~nee and for all, no subsequent additions 
or modifications being needed to coincide with and embrace sub-
sequent changes in the appointive property. It would be an in-
strument of stature and dignity amply sufficient to avouch the 
authenticity of execution and thus satisfy the statutory purpose. 
Robert A. Smith, S. Ed. 
10s When, in the case of corporate stock, transfer must be made on the books of a cor-
poration, this formality could be performed upon the motion of a trustee acting pursuant 
to a formal writing executed by the donee. 
